A Storage administrator configured a read-only NFS export for a specific set of UNIX hosts and added the IP addresses to the host access list. There have been reports that unauthorized hosts are…

Question

Options

• AMinimum security: Kerberos
• BMinimum Security: sys
• CDefault access: read only
• DDefault access: no access

• A
  5% (1)
• B
  9% (2)
• C
  5% (1)
• D
  82% (18)

Explanation

Setting Default access: no access (D) closes the security gap by applying a "deny by default" policy to any host not explicitly listed in the host access list. Without this, the NFS server grants unlisted/unauthorized hosts whatever the default access level is - in this case, likely read-only access, which is exactly the symptom described.

Why the distractors are wrong:

• (A) Kerberos changes the authentication mechanism, not which hosts are allowed to connect - unauthorized hosts would still reach the export, just with a stronger auth requirement.
• (B) Minimum Security: sys is actually the weakest NFS security level (standard UNIX UID/GID trust), and only affects how credentials are verified, not host-level access control.
• (C) Default access: read only is almost certainly the current (broken) setting - it's what's allowing unauthorized hosts in. Leaving or setting it here doesn't fix anything.

Memory tip: Think of NFS host access like a nightclub: the IP list is the VIP list, but if there's no "no access" default for everyone else, strangers walk right in. Default = no access means the door is closed unless your name is on the list.

No community discussion yet for this question.