A security engineer is faced with competing requirements from the networking group and database administrators. The database administrators would like ten application servers on the same subnet for…

Segmenting only applications that fail a security assessment is reactive rather than proactive and ignores the principle that all applications should be evaluated for placement within a security architecture regardless of individual vulnerabilities.

Classifying applications into like security groups and segmenting those groups represents a risk-based, balanced approach that satisfies both teams - it provides meaningful network segmentation to reduce lateral movement risk while grouping similar applications together for administrative efficiency. This approach aligns with the principle of security zoning, where assets with similar sensitivity, trust levels, and functions share a segment, reducing attack surface without creating unmanageable complexity. It is a practical compromise rooted in security best practices rather than an all-or-nothing solution.

While segmenting every application individually is the most secure theoretical approach, it completely disregards the database administrators' legitimate operational requirements and fails to balance competing business needs, which is a core responsibility of a security administrator.

Segmenting only applications with minimal security features inverts sound security logic - applications with fewer built-in security controls are higher risk and may warrant segmentation, but this criterion alone is insufficient and inconsistent as a segmentation policy.