A security engineer is attempting to increase the randomness of numbers used in key generation in a system. The goal of the effort is to strengthen the keys against predictive analysis attacks. Which

Question

Options

• AUse an entropy-as-a-service vendor to leverage larger entropy pools.
• BLoop multiple pseudo-random number generators in a series to produce larger numbers.
• CIncrease key length by two orders of magnitude to detect brute forcing.
• DShift key generation algorithms to ECC algorithms.

• A
  83% (40)
• B
  8% (4)
• C
  2% (1)
• D
  6% (3)

Explanation

Cryptographic key strength depends heavily on the quality of entropy (true randomness) used during key generation. Pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) are deterministic algorithms - they produce sequences that appear random but are mathematically predictable given the seed value. This makes them vulnerable to predictive analysis attacks. An entropy-as-a-service (EaaS) vendor provides access to large pools of true entropy, often harvested from physical phenomena (hardware noise, atmospheric data, quantum events), making the generated keys genuinely unpredictable. Option B is wrong because chaining multiple PRNGs still produces pseudo-random output - garbage in, garbage out. Option C (increasing key length) improves brute-force resistance but does nothing to address the predictability of the key generation process itself. Option D (ECC) changes the mathematical algorithm for key operations but doesn't address the entropy source used to generate the keys.

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