312-50V11 · Question #624
A specific site received 91 ICMP_ECHO packets within 90 minutes from 47 different sites. 77 of the ICMP_ECHO packets had an ICMP ID:39612 and Seq:57072. 13 of the ICMP_ECHO packets had an ICMP ID:0 an
The correct answer is B. ICMP ID and Seq numbers were most likely set by a tool and not by the operating system. Legitimate operating systems increment ICMP sequence numbers per packet; receiving 77 packets all sharing the exact same ICMP ID and Seq values is a strong indicator that a custom tool set these fields to static values.
Question
A specific site received 91 ICMP_ECHO packets within 90 minutes from 47 different sites. 77 of the ICMP_ECHO packets had an ICMP ID:39612 and Seq:57072. 13 of the ICMP_ECHO packets had an ICMP ID:0 and Seq:0. What can you infer from this information?
Options
- AThe packets were sent by a worm spoofing the IP addresses of 47 infected sites
- BICMP ID and Seq numbers were most likely set by a tool and not by the operating system
- CAll 77 packets came from the same LAN segment and hence had the same ICMP ID and Seq
- D13 packets were from an external network and probably behind a NAT, as they had an ICMP ID 0
How the community answered
(61 responses)- A3% (2)
- B67% (41)
- C21% (13)
- D8% (5)
Why each option
Legitimate operating systems increment ICMP sequence numbers per packet; receiving 77 packets all sharing the exact same ICMP ID and Seq values is a strong indicator that a custom tool set these fields to static values.
A worm spoofing 47 source IPs would still generate varied ICMP ID and Seq values per source; identical values across all 77 packets points to a tool setting static fields, not spoofed origins.
A standards-compliant OS ping implementation increments the sequence number with each echo request and uses a unique ICMP ID per session, so two distinct packets will almost never share both values. The fact that 77 packets carry the identical pair (ID:39612, Seq:57072) means a scripted tool or exploit framework hard-coded those fields, which is a classic fingerprint of flood or scanning tools like hping2/hping3. This pattern is used by security analysts to distinguish tool-generated traffic from native OS traffic.
Hosts on the same LAN segment do not share ICMP IDs or sequence numbers; those values are set independently by each sender's network stack.
NAT devices may rewrite source IP addresses but do not zero out ICMP ID and Seq fields; the 13 zero-value packets are more consistent with a different tool or misconfigured ping implementation, not NAT traversal.
Concept tested: ICMP ID and sequence number analysis for tool fingerprinting
Source: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc792
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