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GREM · Question #144

A sample repeatedly checks CPU vendor strings. Which goal is MOST likely?

The correct answer is B. Detect virtualization. Checking CPU vendor strings is a classic anti-analysis technique used by malware to detect whether it's running inside a virtual machine (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V). Hypervisors often expose identifiable vendor strings like "KVMKVMKVM" or "VMwareVMware" via the CPUID…

Malware Obfuscation & Anti-Analysis Techniques

Question

A sample repeatedly checks CPU vendor strings. Which goal is MOST likely?

Options

  • ADetect Intel VT-x
  • BDetect virtualization
  • CEnable encryption
  • DBypass firewall

How the community answered

(50 responses)
  • A
    16% (8)
  • B
    74% (37)
  • C
    6% (3)
  • D
    4% (2)

Explanation

Checking CPU vendor strings is a classic anti-analysis technique used by malware to detect whether it's running inside a virtual machine (e.g., VMware, VirtualBox, Hyper-V). Hypervisors often expose identifiable vendor strings like "KVMKVMKVM" or "VMwareVMware" via the CPUID instruction, so repeatedly querying these strings signals the sample is trying to confirm it's in a real physical environment before executing its malicious payload.

Why the distractors are wrong:

  • A (Detect Intel VT-x): VT-x is a hardware virtualization feature, but checking vendor strings is not how software detects VT-x support - that uses specific CPUID flag bits, not vendor ID strings.
  • C (Enable encryption): CPU vendor identification has no role in enabling encryption; cryptographic routines use algorithm-specific APIs and keys.
  • D (Bypass firewall): Firewalls operate at the network layer; CPU vendor strings are entirely unrelated to network traffic filtering.

Memory tip: Think "VM check = vendor string check." Malware authors know analysts run samples in VMs, so the sample "asks the CPU who made it" - if the answer sounds like a hypervisor, it hides. Vendor string → virtualization detection.

Topics

#Virtualization detection#CPUID instruction#Anti-analysis evasion#Sandbox detection

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