DBS-C01 · Question #28
A company is running a two-tier ecommerce application in one AWS account. The web server is deployed using an Amazon RDS for MySQL Multi-AZ DB instance. A Developer mistakenly deleted the database…
The correct answer is A. Grant least privilege to groups, users, and roles C. Enable multi-factor authentication for sensitive operations to access sensitive resources and API D. Use policy conditions to restrict access to selective IP addresses. Explanation Preventing accidental database deletion requires a layered IAM security approach: least privilege (A) ensures developers only have the minimum permissions necessary for their role, removing the ability to delete production databases unless explicitly required; MFA…
Question
A company is running a two-tier ecommerce application in one AWS account. The web server is deployed using an Amazon RDS for MySQL Multi-AZ DB instance. A Developer mistakenly deleted the database in the production environment. The database has been restored, but this resulted in hours of downtime and lost revenue. Which combination of changes in existing IAM policies should a Database Specialist make to prevent an error like this from happening in the future? (Choose three.)
Options
- AGrant least privilege to groups, users, and roles
- BAllow all users to restore a database from a backup that will reduce the overall downtime to
- CEnable multi-factor authentication for sensitive operations to access sensitive resources and API
- DUse policy conditions to restrict access to selective IP addresses
- EUse AccessList Controls policy type to restrict users for database instance deletion
- FEnable AWS CloudTrail logging and Enhanced Monitoring
How the community answered
(27 responses)- A81% (22)
- B4% (1)
- E4% (1)
- F11% (3)
Explanation
Explanation
Preventing accidental database deletion requires a layered IAM security approach: least privilege (A) ensures developers only have the minimum permissions necessary for their role, removing the ability to delete production databases unless explicitly required; MFA for sensitive operations (C) adds a critical second authentication step before destructive API calls like rds:DeleteDBInstance can execute; and IP-based policy conditions (D) restrict database management actions to trusted network locations (e.g., corporate VPNs), preventing accidental or malicious deletions from unauthorized environments.
Why the distractors are wrong:
- B is incorrect because allowing all users to restore databases is a security anti-pattern that expands access rather than preventing the original problem
- E is incorrect because "AccessList Controls" is not a valid IAM policy type - IAM uses identity-based and resource-based policies, not AccessList Controls
- F is incorrect because CloudTrail and Enhanced Monitoring are detective controls that log what happened after the fact - they do not prevent deletion from occurring
Memory Tip
Think "LMI" - Lock it down, MFA it, IP-restrict it: the three pillars of preventive IAM controls. Any answer describing monitoring or expanding access is reactive, not preventive, and should be eliminated for questions asking how to prevent future incidents.
Topics
Community Discussion
No community discussion yet for this question.