CCM: A hypothetical company called "lnfrastructure4Sure" provides Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) to its clients. A customer wants to review Infrastructure4Sure's hypervisor security…

Choosing a smaller-footprint hypervisor is a correct security measure but is incomplete on its own - it must be paired with monitoring controls such as log analysis to satisfy CCM requirements.

Hardening configuration should reduce areas of vulnerability, not increase them; disabling memory protections actively weakens hypervisor security and contradicts both CCM guidance and security best practices.

Connecting unused physical hardware and enabling clipboard or file-sharing services expands the attack surface, directly contradicting the principle of minimizing exposure in a secure IaaS hypervisor implementation.

Monitoring hypervisor logs is a correct detective control but is insufficient alone; it must be combined with preventive measures like footprint reduction (A) to address CCM hypervisor security requirements.

Selecting a hypervisor with a smaller footprint (A) reduces the exposed code base and available attack surface, directly limiting exploitation opportunities. Ongoing analysis of hypervisor logs (D) enables detection of anomalous behavior or active compromise. The CSA CCM requires both preventive and detective controls for hypervisor security in IaaS environments, making E the complete and correct answer.