Since the implementation of IPv6 on the company network, the security administrator has been unable to identify the users associated with certain devices utilizing IPv6 addresses, even when the…

While the stable autoconf address uses EUI-64 format, simply identifying this does not resolve the mapping problem - it is the temporary privacy extension address that prevents reliable identification.

The interface output shows two 'autoconf' global unicast addresses, indicating Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) is active; SLAAC depends entirely on the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) for router advertisements, prefix distribution, and address resolution, confirming NDP is the IPv6 protocol in use.

6to4 tunneling would produce addresses in the 2002::/16 prefix range; the addresses shown use 2001:200::/32, which are native IPv6 global unicast addresses with no tunneling involved.

IPv6 router advertisements are clearly functioning because the devices have autoconfigured global unicast addresses via SLAAC - advertisements are not disabled.

The interface output shows no tunneling mechanism in use, so disabling IPv6 tunneling would have no effect on the address mapping issue.

The mobile IPv6 router flag is unrelated to privacy extension address generation and would not affect the ability to map users to their IPv6 addresses.

The output explicitly shows an 'autoconf temporary' address alongside the stable autoconf address, confirming IPv6 Privacy Extensions (RFC 4941) are enabled; these extensions generate randomized interface identifiers that change periodically, making user-to-address mapping impossible - disabling privacy extensions forces devices to use only the stable EUI-64-derived address, enabling consistent tracking.

DHCPv6 option code 1 is the client identifier option in stateful DHCPv6; the addresses shown are SLAAC-generated (autoconf), not assigned via DHCPv6, so this action is irrelevant.