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EC-Council

312-50V11 · Question #83

Windows LAN Manager (LM) hashes are known to be weak. Which of the following are known weaknesses of LM? (Choose three)

The correct answer is A. Converts passwords to uppercase. B. Hashes are sent in clear text over the network. D. Effective length is 7 characters. LAN Manager hashes are cryptographically weak due to uppercase normalization, network exposure of derived responses, and password splitting into independent 7-character halves that can be cracked separately.

System Hacking

Question

Windows LAN Manager (LM) hashes are known to be weak. Which of the following are known weaknesses of LM? (Choose three)

Options

  • AConverts passwords to uppercase.
  • BHashes are sent in clear text over the network.
  • CMakes use of only 32 bit encryption.
  • DEffective length is 7 characters.

How the community answered

(28 responses)
  • A
    89% (25)
  • C
    11% (3)

Why each option

LAN Manager hashes are cryptographically weak due to uppercase normalization, network exposure of derived responses, and password splitting into independent 7-character halves that can be cracked separately.

AConverts passwords to uppercase.Correct

LM converts all password characters to uppercase before hashing, which eliminates case sensitivity and drastically reduces the effective keyspace an attacker must search during a brute-force or dictionary attack.

BHashes are sent in clear text over the network.Correct

During NTLM-based authentication, the LM challenge-response derived from the hash is transmitted over the network in a form that allows attackers to capture and crack it offline, effectively exposing the underlying hash value.

CMakes use of only 32 bit encryption.

LM does not use 32-bit encryption - it uses 56-bit DES keys. This choice describes a non-existent weakness; the actual cryptographic flaws stem from key derivation and password splitting, not a 32-bit key size.

DEffective length is 7 characters.Correct

LM splits the password into two independent 7-character segments padded with null bytes, then hashes each segment separately with DES, meaning an attacker only needs to crack a maximum of 7 characters per half rather than the full password length.

Concept tested: Windows LAN Manager LM hash cryptographic weaknesses

Source: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/prevent-windows-store-lm-hash-password

Topics

#LM hashes#password hashing#Windows authentication#weak encryption

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